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Abstract
In an increasingly mobile and diverse world, it is difficult to quantify the risk, or danger,
associated with travelling. Airports have suffered greatly for being unable to define potential
risks and protect against them. Intelligent adversary risk is a complicated high-level issue for
many airports. Airports are targeted because of the large amount of people in a confined space
and the social, economic, and psychological impact of terrorist attacks on the American people.
In the months following September 11th, 2001, the airline industry in the United States lost $1.1
billion in revenue. The American people stayed grounded, for fear of another attack by plane.
Recent airport attacks have had a similar effect. The nearly 350 airport attacks from 2000-2015
presents a massive opportunity for improvement. The presence of risk, in the form of terrorist
attacks, is an influential deterrent for passengers. To combat the risk of attack, airports must
provide a higher level of safety and security to people passing through their terminals. To
decrease the risk of an attack, airports must increase the ability to defend itself. In the case of
intelligent adversary attacks, a decrease in risk can be thought of as an increase in value. MultiObjective Decision analysis (MODA), uses a Value-Focused Thinking model to quantify value.
When dealing with human lives, models need to strive to add value not just increase cash flow.
There are countless projects that could add value, so the selection will be complicated. A
portfolio analysis will use a budget given by the decision maker and turn it into a set of the
highest value projects for those dollars. The goal of this study is to canvas the type of solutions
available, and give an optimal set of solutions to the decision maker.

© 2017 By Joshua Bolton
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgements
Dr. Gregory Parnell has been a model of patience and understanding throughout my
graduate career. He has afforded me the opportunity to complete a dream, and he has done it
with smile. Dr. Parnell is one of the most decorated and storied members of the field of Decision
Analysis, and I am proud to say he was my advisor. He deserves commendation for his work to
progress the field, and for guidance of his graduate students.
Special thanks are extended to the staff of the University of Arkansas Graduate School
for all their guidance, inspiration, and kind acceptance of panicked graduate students.
My wife, Jessica, has been instrumental to my success as a student, and none of this
research would be possible without her support. The countless nights talking through issues, and
being the person who coaches me on the best way to solve problems.
My parents gave me a foundation for learning, and taught me I could achieve my goals
with patience, determination, grit, and faith. Thank you for all you have done to show me how to
navigate through life. I would also like to thank my family for their support over the years,
especially these past two years.
There are countless friends, colleagues, and mentors who have helped me, and given me
guidance. It is not possible to name you all by name, but I hope this serves as a small
appreciation for the support you have provided.

Dedication
I would like to dedicate this work to my wife, Jessica Bolton, and my parents, Curt
Bolton III and Chandra Bolton. You three have put up with me for many years, and I hope, will
continue to do so. Please consider this a show of my appreciation for the friendship you have
given me throughout the years. Life is nothing but a series of friendships, and your friendship
means the world to me.

Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
2. Background ......................................................................................................................... 2
a. Literature Review.................................................................................................... 2
3. Methodology: ...................................................................................................................... 9
a. Decisions & Scope ................................................................................................ 11
b. Value Model.......................................................................................................... 18
c. Portfolio Model ..................................................................................................... 24
4. Insights .............................................................................................................................. 26
a. Current State ......................................................................................................... 27
b. Future State ........................................................................................................... 29
c. Monte Carlo Simulation ........................................................................................ 31
5. Summary ........................................................................................................................... 35
6. Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 38
7. Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 40

List of Figures
FIGURE 1:COST ESTIMATION FOR LAX SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS ........................... 5
FIGURE 2: COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT .............................................................................. 6
FIGURE 3: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR ROUNDTREE AND DEMETSKY .................. 7
FIGURE 4: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE US FROM 1968 TO 2009 ................................. 10
FIGURE 5: DECISION HIERARCHY FOR AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS ........ 12
FIGURE 6: SAM MODEL FOR AIRPORT SECURITY ............................................................ 14
FIGURE 7: VALUE HIERARCHY FOR AIRPORT SECURITY .............................................. 17
FIGURE 8: VALUE MEASURE CALCULATION .................................................................... 19
FIGURE 9: VISIBLE SECURITY RESOURCES PER TERMINAL VALUE CURVE ............ 20
FIGURE 10: AIRPORT SECURITY SWING WEIGHT MATRIX ............................................ 22
FIGURE 11: PORTFOLIO MODEL FOR AIRPORT SECURITY ............................................ 25
FIGURE 12: ALTERNATIVE VALUE COMPONENT CHART .............................................. 28
FIGURE 15: VALUE HISTOGRAM OF MONTE CARLO SIMULATION ............................. 33
FIGURE 16:COST HISTOGRAMS OF MONTE CARLO SIMULATION ............................... 34
FIGURE 17: TORNADO DIAGRAM FOR VARIATION IN VALUE...................................... 35

1. Introduction
Perception of an impending attack on the United States has increased in the past three
years. With crisis in the Middle East, North Korea stocking up on nuclear weapons, and
continued uncertainty in Europe; many Americans are becoming even more fearful of the future.
One continued source of fear caused an approximated $1.1 Billion in revenue loss in 2001, due
to the World Trade Center attacks of September 11th (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The
events of September 11th have caused the United States government to increase airport security
funding and make it the top priority of the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, almost
350 terrorist attacks occurred at airports or on airplanes between 2000-2015, as listed by the
Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). Funding
levels for airport and airplane security increase have come, seemingly, without a question of the
value of counter measures being implemented. Placing a value on a human life is difficult, but
value can be placed on decreasing risk. This study focuses on the best methods to decrease the
risk of an attack.
Before 2001, friends and families could walk passengers up to the gate to board a plane.
Now, there are major security check points, and only passengers can pass through. There is no
doubt security reform was needed, but reform without oversight to the value per dollar of
funding does not provide holistic solutions. Questions like, ‘Do the measures being put in place
actually prevent terrorist attacks from happening’, or ‘Do the added security features make the
airport, as a whole, safer’ need to be addressed. Viewing airports as a system, instead of a series
of independent obstacles, has been challenging in the wake of the tremendous losses experienced
on September 11th. Defining a method for quantifying the ability of a specific technique or tool
to reduce the risk of terrorist activity in a specific airport is important. The goal of this study is to
1

design a portfolio analysis framework for airports to use in assessing: current value of security,
possible projects to increase value of security, and given budgetary constraints, what projects
they should implement. Since putting a dollar value on reduced risk is difficult, a Multiple
Objective Decision Analysis (MODA) model will be used, along with expert opinion to
determine value of actions to improve airport security. This methodology helps an airport to see
the baseline value of current security, and what would be the most beneficial projects or counter
measures to implement given budgetary requirements. Due to the diverse nature of airport
security baselines, available alternatives, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
guidelines, each airport will need to change the alternatives, weights, and current state of the
model. The purpose of the model is to provide a tool to facilitate discussion among airport
security leadership as to current threats, areas of vulnerability, and possible solutions.
Background
The growth of airport security has been significant over the past 15 years. In 2001,
security was any person being able to walk up to the gate after passing through a metal detector.
In 2017, only passengers can pass through security to access the terminals, and they must go
through full body millimeter wave scanners. At large, often category X airports, passengers are
randomly picked to provide a swab of their hands to be processed for residue of harmful
chemicals. Bomb dogs, under-cover agents, and SWAT teams have also become common place
in large airports around the busy times of year. Airports need a methodology to assess the added
risk reduction of additional security measures.
Literature Review
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Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kaduyali, Daniel Simon consider the cost of employing the
security agents at a check point (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The authors note, it takes
roughly 15 seconds for the best, 25 seconds for average, and 60 seconds for worst case scenarios
of a person passing through a security check point. They give the cost of processing 1 million
average passengers as 1.361 million euros or $1.9 million. This does not include the cost of
management, equipment, or situations where passengers cause longer than normal delays. If
these are considered, costs would increase. However, the authors believe the impact of TSA
security procedures on passengers should be assessed. These security procedures have the
potential to cut down or increase time severely. The authors also argue a significant amount of
infractions, 20-40%, go unreported because they are deemed benign (Blalock, Kadiyali, &
Simon, 2007). If a passenger has negative comments or starts acting aggressive, additional time
is required to handle the passenger.
Stewart and Mueller argue too much emphasis has been put on airport security and not
enough on the security of the planes (Stewart & Mueller, 2013). They state in their paper on
Cost-Benefit analysis of airport security that of all terrorist attacks, only .5% are on airports.
They believe an analysis of prevention begins with the probability of attack. They go on to
classify assessed security in terms of four threats: large car bomb, curbside car bomb, luggage or
vest bomb, and public grounds shooting attack. Stewart and Mueller give several possible fixes
for these threats and the probability of detecting the threat. They declare the possibility of an
attack on each major US airport is .2% per year, and the consequences have been relatively
small. However, there have been several attacks in airports have been very deadly in the past
four years, including Brussels, Turkey, and Florida. Planes have previously been the main source
of aviation attacks, but now it has changed to airports (Tuysuz & Almasy, 2016).
3

Stewart and Mueller based their analysis on a report created by the RAND Corporation.
The RAND Corporation performed a vulnerability analysis of the Los Angeles airport (LAX)
and came up with short term solutions to make the airport more secure. The RAND report
utilizes 11 scenarios they believe canvas the most likely situations an attack could be carried out
under. Some of these scenarios reflect actual events and some were created to represent possible
attacks. The report states the desired results are to deter and limit possible damage. RAND
developed a method for creating threat attack options by looking at the airport components,
identifying defenses for each attack option, estimating the feasibility of an attack, examining
historical data, and then compiling these data points. They developed creative and feasible
alternatives with story lines. Then they binned the 11 scenarios into lists of major and minor
threats. They identified three major areas to help reduce risk: improving airport processes,
innovative technology purchases, and new construction projects. They included the costs of the
projects but did not cross analyze the security value of the project (Figure 1). Cost benefit
analysis, or portfolio analysis, was not done for these projects (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, &
Brown, 2004).

4

Figure 1:Cost Estimation for LAX Security Improvements (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown,
2004)

The security options used to help solve major threats at LAX cover a number of possible
avenues of attack. However, they did not show the benefit of the alternative or how much value
is provided by each security option. The most beneficial security options for each of the 11
categories are shown, but no numerical value is assigned to the option. If the value had been
assessed, the cost-benefit could be plotted on a graph instead of being put in a table like figure 2.
This provides little insight into why the alternatives were chosen. (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, &
Brown, 2004).
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Figure 2: Cost-Benefit Assessment (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown, 2004)

Rountree and Demetsky used a portfolio model to examine the security measures of
cargo facilities at airports. They used a survey filled out by major airports to provide a baseline
analysis of the security systems. Then they determined the feasible alternatives and summarized
them by cost, what they screen for, time to inspect the baggage, material discrimination, and
installation type, as shown in figure 3. This knowledge was used, along with a case study of a
major airport cargo facility, to create a computer simulation of outbound cargo flow through an
airport facility. The results of the simulation were posted and discussed, but no cost-benefit
analysis was used to determine the best alternative or an efficient frontier.

6

Figure 3: Alternative Analysis for Roundtree and Demetsky (Rountree & Demetsky)

All four of these papers contribute to the current body of knowledge, and help to lay the
ground work for the next step. The use of three additional papers, on: X-ray machine
effectiveness, the training of employees, and the security screen process provide back ground
information, but do not directly contribute to the knowledge required for modeling.
The literature review identifies the need for portfolio analysis of airport security
alternatives. Current papers look at cargo facilities, TSA screening, luggage screening, postscreening safety, and safety on the ramps. Attackers can often make it through one stage of
security, but having a multi-layered security portfolio would provide a great increase in total
security. Table 1. shows the topics covered by each of the four papers in the literature review.
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Paper
Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon
Stewart & Mueller
RAND Corp
Rountree & Demetsky
Abidi, Et. Al
Gramatica Et Al.
Kirschenbaum

Scope

Optimization
Used

Value Model

Risk Analysis

Value Type

Security Screening
Curb to Security
Terminal, Cargo, and grounds
Cargo Facilities
X-Ray Machine
Training Employees
Security Screening

Linear
-

NPV
NPV
Non-Numeric MODA
MODA
NPV

Monte Carlo
Scenario Analysis
Simulation
-

AFT
AFT
AFT
AFT
AFT
AFT
AFT

Table 1: Airport Security Literature Review Summary

I argue the major flaw with many papers on risk reduction is they do not follow ValueFocused thinking (VFT) (Parnell, Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013). Their Alternative Focused
Thinking (AFT) protects against most of the problems, but does not take care of the underlying
issue of fear. The money lost in the fourth quarter of 2001 was due to fear of another attack. To
decrease the public sense of fear in airport security, confidence in the whole system must be
increased. The next step in airport security modeling is to answer the question of how to
determine the most beneficial outcome for a given budget over a given period. A variable
portfolio model adjusting for the size and passenger throughput is a practical way to determine
the necessary level of funding to maintain safety for all passengers. This research focuses on
Terminal E of the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, but can be adapted for other airports.
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Methodology:
To combat the issue of fear among passengers, an atmosphere of safety must be
cultivated. This paper uses a Value Focused Thinking (VFT) decision analysis methodology.
VFT considers the ideal situation, and then considers how to best achieve a solution close to the
ideal. VFT contrasts with Alternative Focused Thinking (ATF). ATF examines the options and
choses the best option from among them. VFT allows the modeling team to come up with new
creative solutions. Albert Einstein is famously quoted as stating, “We can’t solve problems by
using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” (Mielach, 2012). By defining the
desired value paramount in the model, the best solution set can be found. The first step is to
identify the problem, then create a list of stakeholders, a value hierarchy, an influence diagram, a
list of all possible alternatives, and an evaluation of how much value these alternatives will add.
Value will be determined by a MODA model with expert insight. This will lead to a portfolio
analysis of workable solutions to the types of security challenges faced by airports today. We
know there is no money being directly created by implementing one, or several, of these
projects; to justify these projects we will consider the potential losses prevented. It is easy to
justify improvements by looking at the amount of revenue lost by the attacks of September 11th
(Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). Without attempting to put a value on the nearly 3,000
priceless lives lost, the $1.1 billion dollars lost to the industry by these tragic events provides
justification. The Department of Homeland Security received $3.8 billion in Aviation security
funding in 2015 (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). However, Blalock, et al. have
claimed a significant amount of aviation security infractions go unnoticed and unreported. It is
important to minimize the unreported infractions in the most cost-effective way possible, but the
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focus is not on a particular aspect of the security process, but on providing a complete system to
deter and defeat attackers.
MODA provides a frame work to best allocate aviation security resources to deter an
attack and, if deterrence fails, to minimize the amount of potential injuries, damage, monetary
loss among; passengers, personnel, and airports. The reduction of injuries and damage may come
from the implementation of technology or personnel but cannot simply be assumed. Yearly
evaluations must be done with the model to determine if the implemented solutions are still
relevant. After the attacks of September 11th, there was a great increase in security, and a decline
in injuries and fatalities caused by terrorist attacks. Figure 4 outlines the amount of injuries and
fatalities over each six-year period, starting in 1968 and ending in 2009
(http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php). From 2010-2017, the number of injuries and
fatalities due to attacks is 38 (Johnston, 2017).

Injuries and Fatalities

Injuries and Fatalities in America
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Injuries and Fatalities

1968-1973

1974-1979

1980-1985

1986-1991

1992-1997

1998-2003

2004-2009

18

167

48

31

1855

5398

54

Years

Figure 4: Terrorist Attacks in the US, 1968-2009 (http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php)
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There is a spike from 1992-1997 when the airline industry started to grow rapidly. From
1998-2003, there were 5398 injuries and fatalities, mostly caused by the attack of the World
Trade Center. The following six years saw relatively few injuries and deaths. In the past three
years there has been an increase in attacks, a few of the most devastating include airports in
Brussels and Fort Lauderdale. The attacks from 1998-2003 were by terrorists on airplanes. The
attacks after 2009 are in the airport terminals and atriums. The next step in defense is to secure
these areas and provide safety to passengers before going through TSA.
Decisions & Scope

Risk is difficult to quantify. It is based on knowledge of the motives, knowledge, and
resources of the attackers. It is difficult to have insight into the objectives and the future methods
of terrorist organizations can be very difficult to predict. It is hard to protect against unknown
threats, especially with large, target rich environments such as airports. It is impossible to
completely mitigate all risk. For this study, we will focus on four types of alternatives:
Personnel, Procedures, Technology, and Awareness to mitigate risk and increase security. In the
case of airport security, value can be thought of as the potential reduction of risk to passengers,
airport personnel, and the infrastructure. This is described in the decision hierarchy (Parnell,
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013) found in figure 5. The Decision Hierarchy contains three
categories of decisions: Done deals, In Scope, and Future Decisions. Done deals are decisions
made prior to the start of the modeling process, and cannot be changed. Future decisions are
things beyond the scope of the decision. Future decisions are part of the future research section.
The In Scope section are decisions which are addressed in this paper.
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Figure 5: Decision Hierarchy for Airport Security Improvements

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), and the Department of Transportation regulations are out of the scope of this paper.
Safety and security of passengers and airport personnel, once they board a plane is also out of
scope. Similarly, if a security event happens, the response and how to fix the problem should be
considered for future work. It will focus solely on the items that can be implemented before a
threat occurs. Methods for diagnosing the type of security event are included in the scope, but the
initiation of a response to the event is not. The In Scope decisions are suggestions to the decision
12

maker, and are to facilitate a discussion between the decision maker and their staff to help select
the best portfolio of security options. It is the decision makers’ ultimate responsibility to make
sure the stakeholders are safe. To assist the decision makers, and to focus this project, a
stakeholder identification matrix, can be found in table 1. A Stakeholder Issue Identification
matrix helps the decision maker to understand the parties involved and their concerns (Parnell,
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013).

Table 2: Stakeholder Identification Matrix

The decision maker is the head of airport security. He has several diverse groups of
stakeholders to take into account, and his main concerns are security, cost, and media attention.
Airports are particularly sensitive to the news media because they are a business and rely on
public trust to operate. Each of the stakeholders rely on the others, and they are influenced by
each-other’s actions. These interactions can prove to be significant. Passengers who become
panicked during an attack will complicate the exfiltration process by the TSA officials.
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To understand what the effect of a given implementation, we need to see what people,
processes, and events influence each other. The use of an influence diagram, in figure 6, will
help identify the interdependencies. In this case, we will use a System Risk-ActionsManagement, SAM, model to show which factors, decisions, and risks influence each other or
have some level of relevance. The SAM model shows what particular pieces are management
focused and people focused.

Figure 6: SAM Model for Airport Security

SAM models include management/system influences, decisions and actions to be taken,
and risks/probabilistic analysis (Murphy & Pate-Cornell, The SAM Framework: Modeling the
Effects of Management Factors on Human Behavior in Risk Analysis, 1996). The
probabilistically determined events are listed apart from the decisions and actions to show top
level management what is relavent to the situation. This is particularly important in this situation,
(Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The four decisions and actions come from the decision
14

hierarchy. They are the four things management can do to have an impact on the security of the
terminal: Technology, Awareness, Procedures, and Personnel.
In the case of Airport Security, the Management/System problems are management
involvement in the security process and proper training. Does the management take an interest in
what is happening in daily operations? For proper training, are the security agents given proper
training, then updated training, and recertification? These factors set the tone for the
organization. The Decisions and Actions level includes Technology, Awareness, Procedures, and
Personnel.
Technology includes a variety of systems: computer based, physical, and sensors. This
includes everything from a new biometric scanner for employees, to concrete barricades that
prevent cars from driving into the airport. These are the type of improvements that have
historically been implemented to increase security for airports. Body scanners and mass
spectrometers are just two examples of personnel screening systems currently in use. Each
airport in the world, and subsequently each of the terminals, will have unique needs. The systems
will be highly dependent on the current state of the airport and their budget. This study attempts
to cover the possibilities, not provide a comprehensive list of options.
Examples of Personnel are more TSA agents in the security screening lines, police
officers with bomb dogs, or undercover agents patrolling the airport. Each of these types of
personnel provides increased security and some even provide a feeling of safety for passengers.
They contribute to the overall value of deterrent by providing visible, physical security.
The third and fourth decision are awareness and Procedures. These include, but is not
limited to, the signage in security lines to inform passengers of the proper techniques to passing
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through security seamlessly. A second application of these decision would be posting signs
related to the other types of security used by airports: Geiger counters, undercover agents, and
video surveillance. The cost of processing passengers who are confused is high (Kirschenbaum,
2013). The larger problem is having a significant amount of people standing in one area. Large
clusters of people make an obvious area of attack for potential terrorists. The RAND report
focused on increasing value by taking measures to decrease the amount of people standing in
long lines (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown, 2004). This will also include the procedures
posted for airport employees, and signs noting the increase in systems security.
The probabilistic and risk components to this are many, but they also stem from
the general idea that the probability of an attack is based on the system, new potential systems,
and the adversary’s knowledge of these systems. Do potential terrorists know how to penetrate
them, or do they know that the airport’s defense system is robust enough to prevent the major of
attacks, and will thus be less likely to attack? Therefore, a system’s effectiveness is uncertain,
but can be improved by proper modeling and implementation. The final thing to note is the
probability of detection of an attack. The probability of detecting a gun in a security is not as
high as the 31% it used to be, but the techniques used by Abidi, et al. in 2006 were still only
56.5-69.5% effective in closing the gap (Abidi, Zheng, Gribok, & Abidi, 2006).
The density of people in the atrium and the attacks knowledge of it, bring relevant
consequences to the discussion when looking at the loss level. These factors work towards
increasing the value by increasing the feeling of security and the probability of early detection of
potential threats.
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Figure 7: Value Hierarchy for Airport Security

The value hierarchy shows how airport security improvements can generate value by
improving on one of these four functions: Increase Public Awareness of Security, Demonstrate
Deterrent, Control Access, and Monitor Response. Functions are verb-noun phrases that describe
categories the decision makers should consider when planning to increase value. They represent
four distinct areas of value, but alternatives are not binned by function, rather alternatives can
add value to each of these four functions if they have broad impact. These four functions map to
objectives for improvement. Objectives are specific things which can be maximized or
minimized to increase value. For example, to Control Access, we must minimize unsupervised
access point. Value measures are the numerical way to determine how much value is provided by
that objective. All the decisions/actions from our SAM model should help to maximize or
minimize one or more of these objectives by increasing the numerical value. The benefit in our
portfolio analysis will come from this increase in value.
17

Value Model
The scope of the value model can be found in the value hierarchy. The value hierarchy
begins with the purpose of the research, and then gives four functions to optimize; each of the
objectives under the four functions is a minimization or a maximization item. To increase value,
we must maximize or minimize those objectives by decreasing or increasing the value measure
for that specific objective.
Defining what adds value is a difficult problem. Value is not explicitly seen. If additional
security systems are added to a small, low risk airport, has value been added? If a system is
added to Jackson-Hartfield in Atlanta, the busiest airport in the world, but it does not prevent an
attack, did it add value? In the field of decision analysis, value is defined differently by most
experts. The general principle of value is that it is a measurable way of telling how close you are
to achieving your goal. For airport security, our goal is to have 100% of the passengers passing
through the airport, get from the front doors of the departing airport to the moment they get on
the plane. That encompasses the atrium, security check-points, post security, and the ramp to get
on the plane. In figure 5, in the past five years, we have seen many attacks at airports targeting
passengers, employees, and non-passengers before the security check-points. The value model
focuses on potential for decreasing the risk of attack before the security check-point.
The value model takes a set of alternatives, scores them using the value measures, and
produces a numerical result of the improvement in value. A value measure has two components;
the independent input, x, and a dependent value score for the input, v(x). Five data points are
recorded, using subject matter experts to determine the independent and dependent values. The
value score must have the first point at 0, and the last point at 100. These values give the model a
minimum input to incur any value, and a maximum input to receive the most value. This can be
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seen in figure 8. The name of the value measure is Visible Security Resources per Terminal. If
there are no visible resources in a terminal, then no value is incurred. If there are 20 visible
security resources in the terminal, then 100 value points are incurred. If more than the maximum
amounts of visible resources are present, then no additional value is incurred.

Visible Security Resources per
Terminal

x
0
2

v(x)
0
25

4

50

8

75

20

100

Figure 8: Value Measure Calculation

The value measure calculations are used to determine the amount of value achieved by
the level of the input variable, x. For any level of resources, the amount of value can be
interpolated between the points using a macro, ValuePL. The amount of value per visible
resource can be graphed, and the shape of the curve provides additional insight into the measure.
In figure 9, we see the shape of the curve is concave. We can interpret this as having a view
visible resources per terminal significantly increases the value. Half of the value for this measure
can be received if four visible security resources are present in the terminal. To achieve the other
half of the value, an additional 16 resources must be implemented. This information is vital to a
decision maker who must consider both value and budget. The shape of the curve was obtained
from knowledge of subject matter experts, on how the input variable effects the value level.
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100

Value

80
60
40
20
0
0

4

8

12

16

20

Visible Security Resources per Terminal

Figure 9: Visible Security Resources per Terminal Value Curve

The value measure, Visible Resources per Terminal is part of the Demonstrate Deterrent
Function, and only displays the value for a specific measure. Each of the alternatives has a value
score for this measure. This model has 12 alternatives. Each of the alternatives has a primary
area of value, function. They can provide additional value to other functions, but it is secondary.
The alternatives are the implementation options the decision maker can fund. This value
functions assess the value for each value measure, but does not explain how important each value
measure is to the overall value.
How important are each of those objectives to the overall goal of the research is a
question which keeps decision analysts divided. There are two main philosophies on how to
weigh the objectives. For both processes, the subject matter experts are asked for input. The
Analytical Hierarchy Process, developed by Dr. Saaty, is a process by which the relative
importance of an objective is the measure of how important it is compared to the other objectives
(Saaty). The subject matter experts are asked to a series of pairwise comparison questions in
which they are asked to determine which objective is more important. This process has the
ability to induce motivational bias and Anchoring bias (Montibeller & von Winterfeldt, 2015). If
20

the experts have a specific project or alternative they favor, they are likely to weigh all other
alternatives or projects to be less important than that. This bias will discredit the importance of
every other project, to save the subject matter expert’s favorite. The aggregation of many subject
matter expert’s opinions will only dilute the model.
The second weighting technique is the swing weight matrix. This technique allows the
subject matter experts to provide an unnormalized weight for each value measure, fi, (Parnell,
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013) based on the importance and the variation of the value
measure. Independent scoring allows for a reduction in motivation and cognitive bias by
removing the competitive nature of ratings. Once they are each scored, the score of the value
measure is divided by the sum of all scores, ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖 , to get the normalized weights. By providing
normalized weights, it is easy to see how important to the overall value of the project, a specific
objective is.
𝑤𝑖 =

𝑓𝑖
𝑛
∑𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖

Equation 1: Swing Weight Calculation

If the weights, wi, are summed by objective, each function can be shown to represent a
certain amount of the total normalized value. Using a swing weight matrix allows decision
makers to see how important each function is to the overall value by summing the weights of
each value measure for that function. Figure 10 shows the unnormalized weights in the yellow
column, and the swing weights in the yellow column.
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Swing
Weight
Matrix

Consequences of Improving Measures
Safety of all Airport Personnel

Unmanned Access Points

Improve Security and Effectiveness

fi

wi

100

0.24

High Need
for
Improveme
nt

Need
for
Improve
ment

Delay in Time

fi

wi

Visible Security
Resources per Terminal

80

0.19

Percent of People that
have heard of system

70

0.17
Percent of People that
have heard of system

Some
Work

Response Time in Minutes

60

Adequacy of Response
40

wi

30

0.07

0.14

Minor Work

Access Control

fi

35

0.08

0.10

Figure 10: Airport Security Swing Weight Matrix

Swing weights are based on two distinct criteria: Importance and Need for improvement.
An alternative could include room for improvement, but not be important to improve. For
example, an airport could have no plan for a nuclear attack, but the probability a nuclear strike
will happen to an airport is very low. Nuclear attacks would rank very high on need for
improvement, but very low on the importance for improving. Being able to rank objectives in
terms of both importance and need for improvement helps the decision maker identify the
immediate needs, and the more long-term planning items.
The importance of a value measure is found using swing weights, and the value of an
alternative, for each of the value measures, can be found using the value curve and interpolating
from the 5 points in the value function. By combining these two pieces we can find the weighted
value of each alternative for each value measure. Table 3 shows the transformation of the score
for each alternative on Visible Resources per Terminal to value to weighted value.
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Alternative
Additional Signage in Airport
Publication of Security Features
Randomization of Security Features
Bomb Dogs
Police Officers
Under Cover Agents
Mass Spectrometer
Atrium Video Surveillance
CO2 Sensors
Back Up Power Generator
Mobile Geiger Counter
Surveillance Robot
Current Baseline
Entire Portfolio
Ideal

Scores
1
1
3
4
3
0
1
1
0
0
1
3
14
18
20

Value
13
13
38
50
38
0
13
13
0
0
13
38
88
96
100

Weighted Value
2
2
7
10
7
0
2
2
0
0
2
7
17
18
19

Table 3: Weighted Value Calculation for Visible Security Resources per Terminal

Equation 2 displays the mathematical reasoning for determining the weighted value of an
alternative for each of the value measures. The weighted value, V(x), is equal to the sum of each
swing weight, wi, times the value, vi, of score, xi. A simplified explanation of V(x) is, the total
amount of value for each alternative.
𝑛

𝑉(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 )
𝑖=1

Equation 2: Additive Value Model

The current Baseline line in table 3 shows the score, value, and weighted value for the
current state of security in the chosen terminal. The entire portfolio line shows the maximum
amount of value possible to attain given the current set of alternatives. Finally, the ideal is the
amount of value possible to attain for the given value measure. Visible Security Resources per
Terminal is 19 points of value, out of 100. The clear definition and quantification of value gives
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the decision maker part of the picture, but the cost data is needed. The basis for the costs of each
alternative can be found in the appendix.

Portfolio Model
When choosing to evaluate a set of projects, a decision maker has several quantitative
methods available: Return on Investment (ROI), Cost-Benefit, Portfolio models, etc. Economic
models such as ROI is a good method for problems where all the value can be turned into
dollars. Places like manufacturing and sales can calculate the ROI on hiring more employees or
using more expensive materials. The two major types of models to use cost and value are costbenefit ratios and portfolio analysis with optimization.
Cost-benefit ratios pick projects by a simple ratio of benefits to cost. Cost-Benefit rations
do not allow for addition constraints and assume independence among projects. In an
optimization model the maximum value for a budget will be found. This research uses portfolio
analysis with optimization. Figure 11 shows the model. Each of the alternatives from our value
model are listed with the associated annual costs. The current state of airport terminal security is
the input into the baseline column. A score of 1 designates that the airport uses the alternative in
part of its daily operations, and a score of 0 designates that the alternative is not in daily use. The
decision column utilizes the same scoring technique, and is used to add value to the baseline. The
last four columns are the value added by deciding to, or not to, select an alternative.
The value accumulated for each function cannot surpass the total value of that function
for the entire portfolio. The value for each of the functions using all alternatives in the portfolio
is shown in red at the bottom of the table, and is taken from the value model. The total value for
all functions is summed at the bottom middle of the table. The total cost is the sum of the costs
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for the decisions with a score of 1. The constraint for total cost is show directly below the sum of
costs in the red cell.

Project

Alternatives

P4

Additional Signage in
Airport
Publication of Security
Features
Randomization of
Security Features
Bomb Dogs

P5

Police Officers

P6

Under Cover Agents

P7

P11

Mass Spectrometer
Atrium Video
Surveillance
CO2 Sensors
Back Up Power
Generator
Mobile Geiger Counter

P12

Surveillance Robot

P1
P2
P3

P8
P9
P10

Total Cost
Constraint

Cost

Decision

Baseline

Increase Public
Awareness of Security
Added Value

Demonstrate
Deterrent Added
Value

$750k

0

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$500k

0

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$1,000k

0

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$750k
$500k
$1,000k
$375k

0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

$750k

0

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$500k

0

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$1,000k

0

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

$750k
$500k
$3.50m

0
0
Total Value

0
0
76.86

0.00
0.00
17

0.00
0.00
22

0.00
0.00
13

0.00
0.00
25

17

26

21

25

$4.50m

Monitor Response Control Access
Added Value
Added Value

Figure 11: Portfolio Model for Airport Security

The portfolio model finds the set of optimal solutions. Depending on the funding level of
the decision maker or the desired value a set of alternatives can be recommended. The efficient
frontier technique will be used to create a set of solutions for varying funding levels. portfolio
analysis gives the decision maker the most freedom to choose what they believe to be the optimal
value for each funding level. The mathematical objective and constraints for the optimization
model can be found in equations 3, 4, 5, and 6.
𝑚

𝑛

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∑ 𝑦𝑗 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 )
𝑗=1

𝑖=1

Equation 3: Maximization of Total Value
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𝑚

∑ 𝑦𝑗 𝑐𝑗 ≤ 𝐵
𝑗=1

Equation 4: Cost Constraint

𝑦𝑗 = {

0
1

𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑

Equation 5: Decision Funding Set

Equation 3 states the goal of the optimization model to be the maximization of the total
value of the portfolio. Maximizing the amount of value for a given dollar value allows us to find
the upper limit of value, while constraining the cost. This method, replicated for range of
budgets, will give the efficient frontier. Equation 4 states the sum of all costs, Ci, times the
decision variable, yj, cannot be greater than the Budget, B. Setting a budget allows the decision
maker to put in his budget and create an optimal portfolio. Equations 5 lists the set of values Yj
can be. If the alternative is funded then a 1 is selected, and if it is not funded then a zero is
selected
Insights
The value to the decision maker of having a tool to diagnose areas of improvement large
is beneficial. Use of the same tool to assess the value of alternatives with the cost of providing
the alternatives increases the viability of the tool. In this section we consider the current state of
airport security of DFW terminal D, using an expert’s opinions. Actual data provides a security
risk to any airport being quantifiably analyzed.
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Current State
The purpose of looking at the current state is to find areas of strength and areas of growth
for the security team in Terminal D. We will evaluate each based on the four functions of
security shown in the value hierarchy: Increase Public Awareness of Security, Demonstrate
Deterrent, Control Access, and Monitor Response. Each area will receive an overall value, and
also a value for each of its objectives. These scores come from value of the current security
features. Figure 11 showed the alternatives which DFW utilizes on a regularly recurring basis:
publication of security features, bomb dogs, police officers, atrium surveillance, backup power
generators, and a mobile Geiger counter.
The Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW) airport publishes some of security features in
white papers and other public outlets. They also regularly use teams of bomb dogs to sweep the
terminals, and police officers for additional security presence. DFW has atrium surveillance and
a backup power generator to keep security features active in case of power outages. Each feature
does not add the same amount of value to the model, so it is important to know which features
are key components. Figure 12 is an Alternative value component chart. It shows the amount of
value realized by for each of the alternatives. The color show the contribution by value measure.
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Figure 12: Alternative Value Component Chart

Along the bottom of the chart, all the alternatives are listed. The y-axis of the chart
represents how much value, from the value model, is assessed for each measure. Visually, it is
easy to tell that minimize Unsupervised Access Points and Maximize Public Awareness are both
prevalent in the alternatives. Minimize Uncovered area and Maximize adequacy of response are
both more scarce than the other alternatives. The decision maker will want to pay special
attention to the value measures associated with those objectives because of the scarcity of
solutions.
We can also see bomb dogs, randomizing security features, police officers, and
surveillance robots provide the most value as alternatives. This follows logically with what we
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know about effect of security personnel on the potential for attacks. Terrorist’s seek out easy
targets, and do not attack robust defense systems. The more visible security forces, the more
robust a system.
From the graph we can also see the value of the current baseline compared with the entire
portfolio and the ideal. The baseline provides 77 points of value, and the idea value is 100. The
amount of value that can be achieved is the value score for the entire portfolio, and has a score of
89. The difference between the ideal and the entire portfolio is called the value gap. This is the
amount of value that cannot be achieved with the current technology, resources, and system
knowledge. The gap can close, but it will require a more complex understanding of the threats
posed to the terminal, and advanced knowledge of the methods the attackers will use to cause
harm. Given the security features, we can estimate the cost of security to be $3.5 million dollars
per year. To provide additional value, we must either optimize the current portfolio, or suggest
addition value for additional funding.
Future State
The current spending cost is estimated at $3.5 million dollars. If the decision maker
decides to keep these estimated costs and the 77 value points, we must provide additional levels
of funding. To create the efficient frontier, we will vary the funding level by $.5 million
increments and plot the cost vs. value. Figure 13 details the value of adding projects to the
current baseline.
The greatest increase in value, over the baseline, comes from half million dollars in
support. By adding $.5 million, in the form of a surveillance robot, almost 7 points of value are
added. The second level of funding adds CO2 sensors to the security protocol. The third level of
funding adds undercover agents, but removes the CO2 sensors. The addition of $2.5 million,
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includes; robotic surveillance, CO2 sensors, and undercover agents. Any additional funding, after
$2.5 million, does not increase value. The maximum system value has been achieved, for a total
of $5.5 million.
The second option is a partial overhaul of the baseline to optimize dollars spent. To do
this, we will vary the baseline funding from $1.5 million to $5.5 million to find the efficient
frontier.
The new proposed baseline ramps up value more quickly than the current baseline. At
$3.5 million in funding, the new baseline has 87 value points, while the current only has 77. The
flaw of many airport security tests is the testing of attributes individually. Potential attackers
must beat a series of systems, not just one step. By looking at the steps as a whole, and using our
knowledge of swing weights to focus on measures that add value, not redundancy, we can
increase the value of the system and decrease the cost.

Value vs. Funding Level
100
90

Value Points

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
$1.50m

$2.00m

$2.50m

$3.00m

$3.50m

$4.00m

$4.50m

$5.00m

$5.50m

Funding Spent
New Baseline Value

Old Baseline Value

Figure 13 Cost Vs. Value for New Baseline and additional Funding of Current Baseline
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By letting the simulation pick the alternatives to implement, we maximize the value for a set
budget. The new baseline alternative is independent of the current regulatory scheme, but
provides a case for a restructuring of regulations. For a budget of $2.5 million, terminal D would
receive Bomb Dogs, Police Officers, and Atrium Video Surveillance. Table 4 shows the ramping
of value for the new proposed and current baseline.

Dollars Available New Baseline Value Old Baseline Value
$1.50m
66.68
$2.00m
75.66
$2.50m
82.74
$3.00m
83.65
$3.50m
86.6
76.86
$4.00m
87.5
84.55
$4.50m
88.41
85.45
$5.00m
88.71
88.41
$5.50m
88.71
88.71
Table 4 New vs. Current Baseline

Restructuring the current set of security features could save money and provide more
value. For $2.5 million, Terminal D could have more than 6 additional points in value, and
would save $1 million dollars annually. The restructuring would take time and effort, on the part
of senior management, but the airport would benefit in both dollars and value.

Monte Carlo Simulation

There are hundreds of commercial airports in the United States, and even more aboard.
Each airport will bring its own unique challenges, security concerns, and current baseline. The
weighting of the objectives, pricing of alternatives, and value of alternatives can change
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significantly, depending on the situation. Taking into account variable situations is one of the
most difficult tasks of decision makers. Planning is done to diminish the amount of surprises and
unexpected costs, but there will still be variation in any situation. To best consider variation,
Monte Carlo simulation will be used. Monte Carlo simulation lets the modeler define the
distribution, parameters, and number of randomized simulations. By quantifying the uncertain
inputs and calculating the uncertain value and cost, a fuller picture is provided to the decision
maker. The decision maker will understand the potential for failure, and the best way to protect
against catastrophic failure.
For this simulation we will vary 3 things: cost of alternatives and swing weights.
Varying the swing weights allows the decision maker to see how much variation could be caused
if the subject matter experts perceived value is incorrect. Understanding the variation caused by
the swing weights helps the decision maker to know how robust their decision is. Monte Carlo
simulation uses random number generation to create an n’th number of trials. The distribution
and parameters are set by the modeler, and the number generator creates trials to follow the
distribution. In most cases, a triangular distribution can be used for inputs. The triangular
distribution is useful because it requires only a min, most likely, and max, and roughly
approximates several distributions.
Next, the swing weights are varied from 1 to 100, and the most likely value will be the
value assigned by subject matter experts. Costs will be varied notionally, considering: ease of
access, commonality of use, complexity of the system, propensity to break, and difficulty to
replace. 1000 trials were used to add strength to simulation, and provide width of use. This
simulation shows the distribution of cost and value for the current baseline.
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Figure 15 shows the distribution of value brought by the variation of the swing weights
and value measures. The graph is roughly, normally distributed with a mean of 72.18. The
deterministic value, 76.86, found earlier, is larger than the probabilistic value of 72.18. The value
of 76.86 was found by using expert assessment of the value curves and the weights of the value
measures. The probabilistic value takes into account the worst possible situations, as well as the
most likely, and the best. Human beings tend to ignore the worst-case scenario. The standard
deviation for this distribution is 4.95 points. We can say with 95% confidence, from this
distribution, the value of the baseline system is between 63.8 and 80.0.

Figure 13: Value Histogram of Monte Carlo Simulation

Similarly, the cost of the current systems can be estimated using Monte Carlo simulation.
The costs of each of the alternatives are estimated, using low, expected, and high-costs, and run
through the simulation. Figure 16 contains the results of the cost simulation. The cost distribution
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shown, is the amount of funding required to achieve the baseline value of 77 points. These two
figures come together to create a two-dimensional surface representing the cost and value of the
baseline. This two-dimensional surface allows the decision maker to see the full realm of
possibilities for the current baseline.

Figure 14:Cost Histograms of Monte Carlo Simulation

After seeing the 16 point variance between the upper and lower bounds of the confidence
interval, the decision maker will want to see what caused the variation. A tornado diagram is a
bar graph that visibly shows the amount of variation each variable contributes to the over all
variation. Figure 17 shows the variation, in value, caused by the most significant independent
variables.
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Figure 15: Tornado Diagram for Variation in Value

The top bar on the tornado diagram shows the minimum and maximum value of the total
system when Percent of People that have heard of the System is changed from 1 to 100 in the
swing weight matrix. By itself, Percent of People that have heard of system, can vary the value
13 points. Access control, however, can only vary the value 2 points. If a particular swing weight
is scored higher by the subject matter expert, then the relative value of the other swings weights
will decrease. The weighting of the system highly favors knowledge as a preventative measure.
Knowledge is important asset for the TSA. They believe the most value can be incurred by
terrorists knowing the great amount of preparation that goes into building defense systems.
Summary
The need for airport security is evident in our daily news. There are airport attacks
several times a year, and the attacks have evolved. Our airports have tightened security for areas
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of previous attack, but to save lives a more holistic approach must be taken. Airport security can
no longer be a series of groups operating independently of each other. The security team must be
rigorous and unified. TSA, FBI, airport security, and police forces must operate in conjunction
with one another to patrol the entire airport. Having red team testing of individual units helps
that unit, but terminals will only become more secure if security measures are stacked together to
form a chain of measures. It is much harder for a team of attackers to pass by a layered defense.
This study provides a format for quantifying the value for each step in the process. The curb to
ramp scope allows for law enforcement total control, where in the past attackers have thrived in
atriums and on curbs.
The format of the model allows for decision makers to assign values to the swing weights
to emphasize areas of growth for a terminal, while maintaining the rigor needed for a robust
model. The benefit for a security team is to work through the model and understand the approach
of defining goals, breaking the goals into objectives, providing a way to quantify those goals, and
then rating the alternatives in terms of the value of towards those goals. The value of Monte
Carlo simulation affords a decision maker the ability to understand the impact of uncertainties on
value. The value can change if there are changes to the infrastructure, TSA procedures, and state
of the nation. By reassessing the state of security once a year, the airport will be able to maintain
value. Table 4 summarizes the results of model. If an additional $1 million dollars in funding is
added to the current portfolio, 14 points of value can be added for a total of 89 value points. If,
however, the terminal was to start over, assuming no initial resources, 89 value points could be
achieved using the current estimated budget of $3.5 million.
There are a few concepts which are outside of the scope of this project. This project
utilized an additive value methodology, and assumes the value added by each project is
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independent on the other projects chosen. Investigating the possibility of having dependent
values and how to model them is a piece of future research. As previously mentioned, the
regulations placed by TSA and DHS restrict the range of possible portfolios, and dictate the
current baseline. If the baseline could be changed, due to a change one regulation, or a group of
regulations, the shadow price of the regulation or regulations, could be found. Also, anything
involving the security of parking garages, roads leading into the airport and the tarmac are
outside of the scope, and would require further analysis.
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Appendix
Function
Value Measures

Demonstrate Deterrent
Visible Security Resources per Terminal

Natural or Constructed:`

Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is concave. This is because
the visible presence of a few resources is a
discouragement to attackers.

Natural

Source for Scale:
Dr. Ham (Former DHS Official from DFW)

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
0
25
50
75
100

100
80

Value

Score
x
0
2
4
8
20

60
40
20

Swing Weight of Visible Security Resources per
Terminal
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
70
0.23

Alternative
Additional Signage in Airport
Publication of Security Features
Randomization of Security Features
Bomb Dogs
Police Officers
Under Cover Agents
Mass Spectrometer
Atrium Video Surveillance
CO2 Sensors
Back Up Power Generator
Mobile Geiger Counter
Surveillance Robot
Current Baseline
Entire Portfolio
Ideal

Scores
1
1
3
4
3
0
1
1
0
0
1
3
14
18
20

0
0

Value
13
13
38
50
38
0
13
13
0
0
13
38
88
96
100

4
8
12
16
20
Visible Security Resources per Terminal

Weighted Value
3
3
8
11
8
0
3
3
0
0
3
8
20
22
23

Swing Weights

The number of resources per terminal is defined as the number of
units of police officers, bomb dogs, and security robots present in
each terminal of the airport at all times.

Absolute Weight

Calculation of alternative score
0.30
0.20
0.10
-

Value Measure
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Function
Value Measures

Increase Public Awareness of Security
Percent of People that have heard of system

Natural or Constructed:`

Value
CurveThis
Shape:
The value curve is
concave.
is because potential
attackers will do research to have knowledge of
defense systems, and will know of any defense
systems.

Natural

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
0
50
75
90
100

100
80

Value

Score
x
0
25
50
75
100

40
20

Swing Weight of Percent of People that
have heard of system
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
50
0.20

Alternative
Scores
Additional Signage in Airport
20
Publication of Security Features
20
Randomization of Security Features 30
Bomb Dogs
25
Police Officers
25
Under Cover Agents
0
Mass Spectrometer
10
Atrium Video Surveillance
10
CO2 Sensors
0
Back Up Power Generator
0
Mobile Geiger Counter
0
Surveillance Robot
35
Current Baseline
99
Entire Portfolio
99
Ideal
100

60

0
0

Value
40
40
55
50
50
0
20
20
0
0
0
60
100
100
100

20

80

100

Weighted Value
8
8
11
10
10
0
4
4
0
0
0
12
20
20
20

Swing Weights
Absolute Weight

Calculation of alternative score

The percentage of passengers and non-employee
occupents in the terminal who have heard of the
security system being implemented at that airport.

40
60
Percent Known

0.30
0.20
0.10
-

Value Measure
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Function
Value Measures

Demonstrate Deterrent
Percent of coverage of Airport

Natural or Constructed:

ValueisCurve
Shape:
The value curve
convex.
This is because
attackers will aim for the weakest spot, and
less than total coverage affords them the
opportunities

Natural

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
0
25
50
75
100

Value

Score
x
0
50
75
90
100

Swing Weight of Percent of coverage of
Airport
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
30
0.14

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

Alternative
Scores
Additional Signage in Airport
0
Publication of Security Features
0
Randomization of Security Features 15
Bomb Dogs
25
Police Officers
30
Under Cover Agents
20
Mass Spectrometer
5
Atrium Video Surveillance
15
CO2 Sensors
5
Back Up Power Generator
0
Mobile Geiger Counter
5
Surveillance Robot
20
Current Baseline
80
Entire Portfolio
99
Ideal
100

Value
0
0
8
13
15
10
3
8
3
0
3
10
58
98
100

20

40
60
80
Percent Coverage

100

Weighted Value
0
0
1
2
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
8
14
14

Calculation of alternative score

Swing Weights

The percentage of square footage in a terminal that
can be accessed by security assets within 15
seconds.

Absolute Weight

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
-

Value Measure

42

Function
Value Measures

Monitor Response
Response Time in Minutes

Natural or Constructed:`

Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is negative linear. This is
because each minute of extra minute in
response time is weighted equally

Natural

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
100
75
50
25
0

100

80

Value

Score
x
2
6
10
14
18

60
40
20
0

Swing Weight of Response Time in Minutes
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
30
0.085

Alternative
Scores
Additional Signage in Airport
18
Publication of Security Features
18
Randomization of Security Features 17
Bomb Dogs
17
Police Officers
17
Under Cover Agents
17
Mass Spectrometer
18
Atrium Video Surveillance
15
CO2 Sensors
17
Back Up Power Generator
16
Mobile Geiger Counter
18
Surveillance Robot
17
Current Baseline
15
Entire Portfolio
4
Ideal
2

2

Value
0
0
6
6
6
6
0
19
6
13
0
6
19
88
100

5

8
11 14
Response Time

17

Weighted Value
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
1
2
7
8

Calculation of alternative score

Swing Weights

The time, in minutes, elapsed between an incident
occuring and the correct personnel responding.

Absolute Weight

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
-

Value Measure
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Function
Value Measures

Monitor Response
Adequacy of Response

Natural or Constructed:`

Constructed

Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is convex. This is because a
low accuracy of response can lead to
significant damages.

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
0
10
35
70
100

100
80

Value

Score
x
1
2
3
4
5

60
40
20
0

Swing Weight of Adequacy of Response
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
20
0.10

1
2
3
4
5

Scores
1
1
1
3
2
3
1
3
1
1
1
3
3
5
5

Value
0
0
0
35
10
35
0
35
0
0
0
35
35
100
100

Calculation of alternative score
It takes longer than 5 minutes for the
resources to arrive
The right personnel and resources arrive
within 5 minutes
The right personnel and resources arrive
within 2 minutes
The right personnel and resources arrive
within 1 minute
Within 15 seconds, right personnel and
resources

2

3
Scale

4

5

Weighted Value
0
0
0
3
1
3
0
3
0
0
0
3
3
10
10

Swing Weights
Absolute Weight

Alternative
Additional Signage in Airport
Publication of Security Features
Randomization of Security Features
Bomb Dogs
Police Officers
Under Cover Agents
Mass Spectrometer
Atrium Video Surveillance
CO2 Sensors
Back Up Power Generator
Mobile Geiger Counter
Surveillance Robot
Current Baseline
Entire Portfolio
Ideal

1

0.30
0.20
0.10
-

Value Measure
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Function
Value Measures

Control Access
Access Control

Natural or Constructed:`

Constructed

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value
Curve
Shape: This is
The value
curve
is concave.
because the visible presence of a few
resources is a discouragement to
attackers.

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
0
25
50
75
100

100

80

Value

Score
x
1
2
3
4
5

60
40

20
Swing Weight of Access Control
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
30
0.08

1
2
3
4
5

0

Value
0
0
75
75
50
75
25
50
0
25
25
50
75
75
100

1
2
3
4
Constructed Scale

5

Weighted Value
0
0
6
6
4
6
2
4
0
2
2
4
6
6
8

Calculation of alternative score
It detects breach attempts and denies access less
than 95% of the time.
It detects breach attempts and denies access 95% of
the time.
It detects breach attempts and denies access 100%
of the time.
It detects breach attempts, denies access, and sends
a notification.

Swing Weights
Absolute Weight

Alternative
Scores
Additional Signage in Airport
1
Publication of Security Features
1
Randomization of Security Features 4
Bomb Dogs
4
Police Officers
3
Under Cover Agents
4
Mass Spectrometer
2
Atrium Video Surveillance
3
CO2 Sensors
1
Back Up Power Generator
2
Mobile Geiger Counter
2
Surveillance Robot
3
Current Baseline
4
Entire Portfolio
4
Ideal
5

0

0.30
0.20
0.10

-

Value Measure

It detects breach attempts, denies access, sends a notification, fail
safe feature that prevents precedural violation from happening
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Function
Value Measures

Control Access
Unmanned Access Points

Natural or Constructed:`

Natural

Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is concave. This is because
the visible presence of a few resources is a
discouragement to attackers.

Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion

Value Curve
Value of Score
v(x)
100
75
50
25
0

100
80

Value

Score
x
0
6
9
12
15

60

40
20

Swing Weight of Unmanned Access Points
Absolute Score
Swing Weight (wi)
60
0.17

Alternative
Scores
Additional Signage in Airport
10
Publication of Security Features
10
Randomization of Security Features 10
Bomb Dogs
6
Police Officers
7
Under Cover Agents
7
Mass Spectrometer
10
Atrium Video Surveillance
10
CO2 Sensors
10
Back Up Power Generator
10
Mobile Geiger Counter
10
Surveillance Robot
8
Current Baseline
6
Entire Portfolio
6
Ideal
0

0

0

Value
42
42
42
75
67
67
42
42
42
42
42
58
75
75
100

4
6
8
Number of Points

10

Weighted Value
7
7
7
13
11
11
7
7
7
7
7
10
13
13
17

Calculation of alternative score

Swing Weights
Absolute Weight

Count of the number of unmanned access points in
a terminal. Excluding actively monitored points.

2

0.30
0.20
0.10
-

Value Measure
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Needs Improvement
----->

Swing Weight Matrix

Unmanned Access Points

<-------More Critical-------Visible Security Resources per
Terminal
Percent of People that have
heard of system

Percent of coverage of Airport

Access Control

Adequacy of Response

Response Time in Minutes

Value Function
Unnormalized Weight Swing Weight (wi)
0.24
Unmanned Access Points
100
0.10
Access Control
30
Adequacy of Response
20
0.08
0.14
Response Time in Minutes
60
Percent of People that have heard of system
30
0.07
0.17
Percent of coverage of Airport
50
Visible Security Resources per Terminal
70
0.19

Swing Weights
Absolute Weight

0.30
0.25
0.20

0.15
0.10
0.05

Unmanned
Access
Points

Access
Control

Adequacy Response Percent of Percent of Visible
of
Time in People that coverage of Security
Response Minutes have heard Airport Resources
of system
per
Terminal

Value Measure
Swing Weight (wi)

Value Function
Rationale for Value Measure Position
Unmanned Access Points
Unmanned access points are likely targets for terrorists
Access Control
Controling access prevents terrorists from entering
Adequacy of Response
Sending the right personel to a problem sight is important
Response Time in Minutes
Quicker responses prevent catastrophic problems
Percent of People that have heard of system Knowledge of defense systems is a deterent for terrorists
Percent of coverage of Airport
Full Over sight of the airport leads to quick reactions
Visible Security Resources per Terminal
The greatest deterent is a show of force
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